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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF CONFISCATORY DECREES
Introduction
Under the strain and chaos of world conditions, our courts are
again confronted with the formidable task of adjudicating a mass of
litigation resulting from the confiscatory decrees enacted by foreign
nations.
A confiscation is in essence, the appropriation without compensa-
tion of one's private property, to the use of the State.' The exercise
of the power to confiscate does not under modem precepts of Inter-
national Law, enjoy the approval it has heretofore received.2 Never-
theless, it is common knowledge that confiscations are not altogether
infrequent.3
The cases may be conveniently divided into two groups:
I. Those cases where the property or res affected by the decree
is located within the territorial jurisdiction of the country enacting the
confiscatory law, and
II. Those cases where the property or res, "title" to which will
be transferred by the decree, is situated in a country other than the
confiscating State.
The factor whether the government decreeing the confiscation is
a de jure or a de facto government, has not been included in the above
classification, since the only difference between the two governments
is the element of "recognition", 4 and it is submitted that "recognition"
has extremely little relevancy to the problem when the litigants are
private persons.3 "Recognition" is of importance when the foreign
sovereign wishes to be endowed with the legal advantages flowing
therefrom, such as the privilege of bringing suits in the courts of the
I See Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796); 1 BoUVIn, LAW Dic-
TIONARY (3d Rev.) 595.
24 ENCYCLOPAEDiA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 183-187. See resolution of
International Law Association id. 186, to the effect that "it is contrary to prin-
ciples of International Law to deprive a foreigner, or a member of a protected
minority, of the fundamental rights to which he is entitled as owner, * * *
without real compensation". See also Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 122
(U. S. 1814) ; United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51 (U. S. 1833).3 See Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations (1940) N. Y. U. L. Q. Ray.
327; Connick, The Effect of Soviet Decreed it American Courts (1925) 34
YALE L. J. 499; Domke, 65 N. J. L. J. 37, January 22, 1942.
4 1 MoORE, DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906) 119; Wulfsohn v. Rus-
sian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923).
5 See Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. N. Y. Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456(1934); Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679
(1933) ; Borchard, Extraterritorial Confiscations (1942) 36 Am. J. INT. L. 275.
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recognizing State,6 and as a result of its status as a sovereignty, would
also be immune from suits in those courts. 7 But, simply because our
political branch of the government 8 has extended "recognition" to a
foreign nation, emphatically does not mean that our courts will ipso
facto give effect to the laws promulgated by such "recognized" nation. 9
Whether or not the courts of the forum will give effect to foreign laws
and judgments of even a fully "recognized" government, is a matter
to be determined by the court of the forum according to its own
notions of what is just and proper. Differently put, a State will not
give effect to or enforce a foreign law if it is repugnant to the public
policy of the forum.10
The foregoing is but a necessary concomitant to the practicable
doctrine of territorial supremacy. Accepting, as we must, as our
hypothesis, the notion that the territorial sovereignty is supreme and
has exclusive authority within its jurisdiction, it follows inescapably
that any restrictions imposed from external sources, without the
assent of such State, is an infringement of and in derogation of sover-
eignty. Since obviously, the municipal laws of a State do not, as
such, operate beyond its own territory, it again follows that property
situated within the physical boundaries of one State can be affected by
the laws and legislative acts of another State, only in so far as such
laws are permitted so to affect such property, and the determinative
query is always whether the result would be abhorrent to the mores
of the forum."'
6 Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255,
139 N. E. 259 (1923). In Lehigh Valley R. R. v. State of Russia, 21 F. (2d)
396 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 571, 48 Sup. Ct. 159 (1927), the
"recognized" Kerensky Government was permitted to sue, although, in fact, the
Soviets had swept it from power and control for nearly a decade. See also
The Sapphire, 78 U. S. 164 (1870); The Plaza, 277 Fed. 91 (E. D. N. Y.
1921); Republic of Honduras v. Soto, 112 N. Y. 310, 19 N. E. 845 (1889).
7 See Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N. Y.
372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923) ; Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in Amiri-
an Courts (1932) 26 Am. J. INT. L. 261; Fraenkel, The Juristic Status of
Foreign States (1925) 25 COL. L. Rav. 544. On the kinds of governments and
their powers, see PERGLER, JUDICIAL I1NTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES (1928) § 11.8 See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309 (1918);
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct. 80 (1890) ("Recognition" of
foreign governments is within the legislative and executive powers); Rose v.
Himely, 4 Cranch 241 (U. S. 1808).
9 "Recognition does not compel our courts to give effect to foreign laws if
they are contrary to our public policy." MR. JusTicn CRANE, in Dougherty v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 90, 193 N. E. 897 (1934).
10 "No action can be maintained upon a cause of action created in another
state, the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the
forum." RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 612; Lorenzen, Terri-
toriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 736,
745, 748.
11 On the legal effects of territorial supremacy, see PERGLER, JUDICIAL IN-
TERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TE UNITED STATES (1928) § 17.
For the so-called "exceptions" to the application of a foreign law, see MINOR,
1942 ]
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The additional factor whether the party deprived of his property
is a citizen of the United States, or is a foreign national, has not been
included in the classification for the reason that such factor is, at most,
but an element tending to move the discretion of the court. It is by
no means pivotal or decisive. As to property within our borders, it is
believed that some decisions have attributed altogether too great an
importance to the fact whether the victim of the foreign confiscation
decree was a "local creditor" or a foreign national.'2 It being axio-
matic that equality among men is the keystone of justice, it becomes
rather difficult for one to submit to the view that the nationality of the
litigant warrants or justifies a difference of treatment. Furthermore,
as a Constitutional Law proposition, the amendments to the Federal
Constitution guaranteeing "due process of law", are not confined
solely to the protection of citizens.'3 The protection of those amend-
ments is extended to all persons within the jurisdiction, and it would
be doing no violence to the Constitution to invoke the Fifth Amend-
ment on behalf of a foreigner having property in this country. In
the Amendment we find a codification of an historical "public policy".
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1901) §§ 5-11. Professor Minor therein states that "inter-
national comity" is nothing more than "an enlightened sentiment of justice and
policy". See also SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Guthrie's
Translation, 2d ed., Rev.) 68-71, 76-77; WESTLAKE, A TRATIsE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1905) 53; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 163,
16 Sup. Ct. 139 (1895) ; Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 24, 42 N. E. 419,
423 (1895); Howard v. Howard, 200 N. C. 574, 158 S. E. 101 (1931).
12See MR. JusTIcE SUTHERLAND in United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S.
324, 332, 57 Sup. Ct. 758 (1937). "* * * our Constitution, laws and policies
have no extraterritorial operation, unless in respect of our own citizens. * * *
What another country has done in the way of taking over property of its
nationals, and especially of its corporations, is not a matter for judicial con-
sideration here. Such nationals must look to their own government for any
redress to which they may be entitled." In the Belmont case there was no
question under the Fifth Amendment. See note 23, infra; Disconto Gesellschaft
v. Umbreit, 208 U. S. 570, 28 Sup. Ct. 337 (1908); MR. JusTICE RIPPEY dis-
senting in Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280 N. Y.
286, 317, 321-323, 20 N. E. (2d) 758 (1939) ; Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-
Gesellschaft, 277 N. Y. 474, 14 N. E. (2d). 798 (1938); Frenkel & Co. v.
L'Urbaine Fire Ins. Co. of Paris, France, 251 N. Y. 243, 249, 167 N. E. 430
(1929); cf. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 19 Sup. Ct. 165 (1898). "Once
properly in our court and accepted as a suitor, neither the law, nor court
administering the law, will admit any distinction between the citizen of its own
State and that of another. Before the law and in its tribunals there can be no
preference of one over the other." MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PARKER in Hibernia
Nat Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367, 385, 38 Am. Rep. 518 (1881) ; Matter of
Accounting of Waite, 99 N. Y. 433, 439, 2 N. E. 440 (1885).
13 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1886). See REv.
STAT. § 1977 (All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall





Typical of the cases coming within the first group, is Salimoff &
Co. v. Standard Oil Co. 1 4 The Soviet Government sold oil to
the defendant obtained from the plaintiffs' confiscated oil lands. The
plaintiffs, Russian nationals, in an action for an accounting, argued
that the confiscation by an "unrecognized" government was equiva-
lent to a seizure by bandits, and therefore could not affect the "title"
of the plaintiffs. The contention was unsound since obviously the
Soviet Government, though then "unrecognized" by the United States,
was the de facto government of Russia, and its decrees valid by the
law of nations. The operative facts having occurred in Russia, the
law of Russia determined their validity. 15 A case parallel to the
Salimoff case is Oetjen v. Central Leather Company. 6 The plaintiff
brought an action to replevin two consignments of hides to which the
defendant asserted ownership through a purchase from General
Francisco Villa in Mexico during a civil war then in progress. The
revolution having been successful, the seizure by the de facto govern-
ment of property within its territorial jurisdiction and under its con-
trol, was an act, the legality of which could not be re-examined by
our courts, even though the seized property was subsequently brought
into the forum.17 However, if the faction that undertakes the con-
fiscation and seizure, does not ultimately attain the dignity of a gov-
ernment, either de jure or de facto, its decrees will not be accorded the
force of law, and are therefore, ineffectual to divest the owner of
"title" to the property seized. 8
II
A more significant problem is encountered in the bulk of litiga-
tion coming within the second group. Should our courts give effect
to these decrees as to property with a domestic situs? Turning for
'4 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679 (1933).
15 See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 29 Sup.
Ct. 511 (1909) ; Slater v. Mexican Nat. Ry., 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581
(1904) ; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. df New York, 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E.198 (1918); Alabama Great Southern R. R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803(1892).
16 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309 (1918).
17 See Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Ltd., 246 U. S. 304, 38 Sup. Ct. 312(1918) ; MacLeod v. United States, 229 U. S. 416, 33 Sup. Ct. 955 (1913);
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct. 83 (1897); Terrazas v.
Donohue, 115 Tex. 46, 275 S. W. 396 (1925); Terrazas v. Holmes, 115 Tex.
32, 275 S. W. 392 (1925) ; Luther v. Sagor, 1 K. B. 456 (1921), rev'd, 3 K. B.
532 (1921).
18 See Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176 (1877) (When military forces of
Confederacy were overthrown, it utterly perished, and with it all its enact-
ments); Cia Minera Ygnacio Rodriguez Ramos, S. A. v. Bartlesville Zinc Co.,
115 Tex. 21, 275 S. W. 388 (1925). See also Note, De Facto Governments-
The Significance of Their Acts in Our Courts (1933) 8 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 119.
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guidance to the "Russian" cases, we see that the courts of no country
would give any effect to the confiscatory decrees as to property having
a situs in the forum, either before 19 or after 20 the "recognition" of
the Soviet Government. Though several grounds were stated for hav-
ing denied extraterritorial effect to the confiscation decrees, it is mani-
fest that the determining factor was the repugnancy to the local policy.21
Since a Russian confiscation of New York property is beyond the
jurisdiction and power of Russia, the effect of such a confiscatory
decree, as to property having a situs in New York, must be deter-
mined by the New York courts.
The application of the principles enunciated in these "Russian"
cases could easily be implemented to prevent our giving effect to the
confiscatory decrees of other nations, but the unique circumstances
surrounding our "recognition" of Russia, which led to the portentous
decision of United States v. Pink,22 might have the unfortunate effect
of beclouding some well-settled doctrines of law. The Supreme Court
of the United States, in the Pink case, having before it the task of
construing the "Litvinov Assignment",2 3 held that the international
compact concluded by our President, made the question a federal one,
and completely overrode New York public policy, and thus deprived
19 Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. The National City
Bank of N. Y., 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 878,
51 Sup. Ct 82 (1930); James & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co. Am., 247 N. Y. 262, 145
N. E. 917 (1928) ; Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 147
N. E. 703 (1925); James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 248,
146 N. E. 369 (1925) ; Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario,
235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923). Connick, The Effect of Soviet Decrees
in Anerican Courts (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 499. For English, French, German
and Swiss decisions see Nebolsine, The Recovery of the Foreign Assets of
Nationalized Russiatt Corporations (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1130. See also
Bourne v. Bourne, 240 N. Y. 172, 148 N. E. 180 (1925).
2 0 Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. N. Y. Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456
(1934). See cases cited in United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 280 N. Y.
286 (1939), judgment afflrmed by an, equally divided court, 309 U. S. 624, 60
Sup. Ct. 725 (1940).
21 Supra notes 9, 10, 11, 19, 20. "It belongs exclusively to each sovereignty
to determine for itself whether it can enforce a foreign law * * *." Marshall
v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 24, 42 N. E. 419, 423 (1895). See WHARTON, CON-
FLIcT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1905) § 4a; MINoR CONFLICT OF LAWS (1901) § 5
et seq.
2 2 United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 62 Sup. Ct 552 (1942).
23 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 57 Sup. Ct. 758 (1936).
The majority in the Pink case relied upon the dictum of MR. JUSTICE SuTFRa-
LAND in the Belmont case, to the effect that the mere repugnance of the Soviet
decrees to the public policy of the forum would not be a sufficient ground to
deny them effect after "recognition". In fact, the Belmont case merely held
that the United States as confiscatory assignee, had a cause of action against a
stakeholder arising out of the "Litvinov Assignment". The question whether
the assignment to the United States would have prevailed over adverse private
claims was not therein decided for there was no adverse claimant in that suit.




the State of New York of its power to determine for itself what law is
to apply to property rights within the state.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone in his dissenting opinion, in which Mr.
Justice Roberts concurred, noted that the assignment to the United
States was not to be construed as a license to emasculate state public
policy; and further, that the decision attributed to the recognition of
Russia and the assignment, a "potency * * * which is lacking to the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution".2 4 Mr. Chief Justice
Stone is, of course, correct in the assertion that "* * * a state, follow-
ing its own law and policy, may refuse to give effect to a transfer made
elsewhere of property which is within its own territorial limits". 25
Several excellent articles have already appeared questioning the
soundness of the Pink decision 26 in view of its deviation from well-
defined doctrines of law, and its impairment of the protection it was
heretofore believed the Fifth Amendment of our Constitution afforded
private property. The further observation may be made that the
decision extolled an executive agreement by according to it the legal
effect of a treaty, and consequently made it "the supreme Law of the
Land" 2 7 thereby overriding any conflicting state policy.28 It is
extremely doubtful that the parties to the "Litvinov Assignment"
contemplated that as a result of the agreement, the Russian confisca-
tory decrees would be given extraterritorial force and actually effect a
transfer of "title" to American-situs property.29 There is certainly
no such intimation in the negotiations, and since the parties must have
been aware of the resolute refusal of American courts to give extra-
territorial effect to those decrees,3 0 such an intent would have been
perspicuously expressed.
After the Pink case had been decided, a conversion action was
prosecuted in the Supreme Court of New York, by a citizen of France
24 See MR. CnEF JusTicE STONE, dissenting in United States v. Pink, 315
U. S. 203, 248, 62 Sup. Ct. 552, 574 (1942).
25 315 U. S. 246, 62 Sup. Ct. 573; see Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211, 54
Sup. Ct 615 (1934) ; Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139 (U. S. 1869) ; Edu-
cational Studios v. Consolidated Film Industries, 112 N. J. E. 352, 164 Ati. 24(1933) ; Castrique v. Imrie, L. R. 4 H. L. 414 (1870) ; Lorenzen, Territoriality,
Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YAm L. J. 736, 739, 740, 741.
26 Borchard, Extraterritorial Confiscations (1942) AM. J. INT. L. 275;
Jessup, The Litvinov Assignment and the Pink Case (1942) AM. J. INT. L.
282; Note, Effect of Soviet Recognition Upon Russian Confiscatory Decrees
(1942) 51 YALE L. J. 848; Note (1942) 30 GEo. L. J. 663.
27 U. S. CoNsr. Art. VI; cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U. S. 304, 57 Sup. Ct. 216 (1936).
28 See McCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXEcUTIVE AGREEmENTS (1941) 272
et seq. Professor Borchard has expressed the opinion that the thesis of Mr.
McClure to evade the treaty-making power by conferring greater power on the
executive is "unfortunate advice", and that such an end is unsound. Borchard,
Book Review (1942) 42 CoL L. Rav. 887.
29 Supra note 26.
30 See United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 280 N. Y. 286 (1939), 309
U. S. 624, 60 Sup. Ct. 725 (1940) ; Connick (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 499; Bor-
chard (1937) 31 Am. J. INT. L. 675; supra note 26.
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against a French corporation doing business in New York, for the
wrongful detention of securities delivered to the defendant in New
York pursuant to a bailment agreement. The defendant set up as a
first separate and complete defense, "duly enacted" decrees of the
French Government depriving the plaintiff of his French nationality
and confiscating his assets, including the securities specified in the
complaint. In other words, the defendant-bailee pleaded "title" in a
third person, viz., the French Government. Plaintiff moved to strike
out the defense on the ground that the confiscation decree (notwith-
standing its enactment by a government "recognized" by the United
States) is contrary to our public policy and shocking to our sense of
justice and equity. Mr. Justice Bernstein denied the plaintiff's mo-
tion,31 stating that since decisions such as the Vladikavkazsky Railway
case, "the Supreme Court of the United States has adopted a different
view of the effect of such a confiscation decree." Upon appeal to the
Appellate Division, defendant urged that, "The case of United States
v. Pink furnishes the last word on the subject." 32 The brief on
behalf of the French Government as amicus curiae, placed reliance
upon, and quoted from Mr. Justice Shientag's opinion in Anderson v.
N. V. Transandine etc.,39 in which case a decree of the State of the
Netherlands was given effect. But, certainly there is little analogy
between the two decrees. As stated by Mr. Justice Shientag:
The Netherlands Decree is a measure of protection, not of expropriation.
Its purpose is to conserve, not to confiscate; to protect the rights of the indi-
vidual, not to destroy them.3 4
The Appellate Division, First Department,3 5 reversed, and
granted plaintiff's motion to strike out the defense. Mr. Justice
Townley stated that "The only cases which have given validity to
confiscation decrees are cases arising under the Litvinov Assignment".
After quoting from the Pink and Belmont cases, he stated that "no
such situation is presented in the case at bar and the public policy of
the State of New York still exists and must be enforced by this
31Bollack v. Soci6t6 Gfn6rale Pour Favoriser Le D~veloppement Du
Commerce et De L'Industrie En France, 177 Misc. 136, 30 N. Y. S. (2d)(1941), rev'd, 263 App. Div. 601, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 986 (1st Dep't 1942), motionfor leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals denied, - App. Div. -, 35 N. Y. S.
(2d) 717 (1942).
32 Defendant-Respondent's Brief, pages 9-10. Bollack v. Socit6 G~nrale,
etc., supra note 31.33 Anderson v. N. V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij (State of the
Netherlands, Intervenor), - Misc. -, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 547 (1941), aft'd, 263
App. Div. 705, 858, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 194 (1941). Affirmed by Court of
Appeals, see N. Y. L. J., Oct. 2, 1942.
34 MR. CHIEF JusTicE LEHMAN, writing for the Court of Appeals, said:
"Under its [Netherland decree] terms, the state becomes in effect a trustee for
its subjects of their property which might otherwise be without protection * * *.
* * * A Decree designed for such effect may hardly be said to offend a public
policy of this state." Supra note 33.
35 Supra note 31.
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court. * * * the decree is offeniive to this public policy and cannot be
enforced"., 6
Plaintiff's position was further fortified by the recent addition of
the words "or any confiscatory law or decree thereof" to Section
977-b of the New York Civil Practice Act.37  That section is certainly
definitive of New York public policy, and even though the section
merely applies to the foreign corporations, it is inconceivable that
New York should have a different policy toward individuals of a
foreign nationality than it has toward the foreign stockholders of
foreign corporations.
The New York courts have also had the occasion to consider the
validity or effect to be accorded to the decrees of the German occupy-
ing authorities, in cases involving the application of Section 51-a of the
New York Civil Practice Act.38 In order that a defendant stake-
holder may have the benefits of that section, it must appear that there
is an adverse claim to the fund for which the plaintiff is suing, and
the courts have uniformly held that any "claim" that a foreign
"liquidator" may assert, "would be predicated on a fiction which
would receive no recognition in our courts." 89 "The liquidation
process is sheer confiscation." 40 Mr. justice Pecora of the New
York Supreme Court, although apparently basing his conclusion on
the factor of non-recognition by the United States Government of the
German military occupation of Holland, tersely declared:
Therefore, any German decrees promulgated in the Netherlands should be
given no force or effect whatever in the determination of questions involving
property in this State. The purported claims to the property of plaintiff cor-
poration, consisting of two communications received herein by defendant, have
no reasonable foundation, and should be regarded as capricious and fanciful.4 '
36 The second defense related to the non-compliance with Executive Order
No. 8389 as amended. In the view taken by the court, this defense had no
relation to the issue, for the defendant's payment of a judgment rendered against
it could be conditioned upon plaintiff's compliance with the regulation.
37 N. Y. Civr. PRAcTIcE AcT § 977-b relates to the liquidation and distribu-
tion of the assets of dissolved or "nationalized" foreign corporations. It de-
clares that any confiscatory law or decree shall have no extraterritorial effect
or validity as to the property, "tangible or intangible, debts, demands or choses
in action of such corporation within the state * * *". See Meyer v. Petrograd
Metal Works, 256 App. Div. 1077, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 125 (1939), motion for
leave to appeal denied, 281 N. Y. 887, 24 N. E. (2d) 28 (1939).
38 For a discussion of the recent New York adverse claims legislation, see
PRASHIER, CASE.S AND MATmuIALS ON NEW YORK PLEADING AND PRACICE
(2d ed. 1937, Supplement, Part II, 1942) 300 et seq., wherein many of these
confiscation cases are digested.3 0 
MR. JUsTIcE COLLINS in Anninger v. Hohenberg, 172 Misc. 1046, 1047,
18 N. Y. S. (2d) 499, 500 (1939).
40 Supra note 39. To same effect, see Koninklijke Lederfabriek v. Chase
Nat. Bank, 177 Misc. 186, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (1941); Osborne v. Banco
Aleman Antioqueno, 176 Misc. 664, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 236 (1941) ; Loeb v. Bank
of Manhattan Co., - Misc. -, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 497 (1939) ; Stern v. Steiner,
Inc., - Misc. -, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 44 (1939).41 Amstelbank v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 177 Misc. 548, 552, 31 N. Y.
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Conclusion
The Bollack decision 42 is indeed fortunate in that it reaffirms
vital principles of law,43 and limits the Pink decision to its proper
sphere. The French confiscatory decree was obviously a "penal"
law, and it is at this late stage most elementary that, "The courts of
no country execute the penal laws of another". 44  Such a doctrine
was concretely established at an early date4 in the development of
Anglo-American jurisprudence, and has been universally applied.46
No doubt, many cases similar to the Bollack case will soon come
before our courts. It is hoped that the principles therein applied will
again be even more freely implemented to effect a proper administra-
tion of justice, and thwart the oppression that would otherwise result.
Fortunately, indeed, the principles are sufficiently flexible to permit
the attainment of that end.
EDWARD D. RE.
S. (2d) 194, 199 (1941). But cf. Ornstein v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique, - Misc. -, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 524 (1941); Steinfink v. North
German Lloyd S.S. Co., 176 Misc. 413, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 918 (1941). (In the
latter two cases, plaintiffs were unsuccessful in obtaining a refund of money
paid to the defendants for transportation not provided because of war. It is to
be noted that the actions were to recover the equivalent of the German marks
in dollars.)42 Supra note 31.
43 On the German law depriving Jewish emigrants of nationality and
property, see Kauffmann, Denationaisation and Expropriation (1942) Vol.
XCII (British) LAW JOURNAL 93.
44 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL in The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66 (U. S.
1825); cf. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims(1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 193; supra note 21. See cases cited in 14 Am. JUR.,
Criminal Law § 224.
45 See C.-J. DE GREY in Rafael v. Verelst, 2 Win. BI. 1055, 1058, 96 Engl.
Rep. 621, 622 (1776). "Crimes are in their nature local, and the jurisdiction of
crimes is local. In Folliott v. Ogden, 1 H. BI. 131; 3 T. R. 726 (1792), the
litigants were British subjects who had resided in New York and New Jersey
when laws were passed in those states whereby they were attainted and theirproperty confiscated. The court held that the plaintiff had not been divested of
his rights since the New York and New Jersey laws were penal and therefore
could have no effect beyond the borders of those states. To same effect see
Wolff v. Oxholm, 6 Maule & Selw. 99, 18 Rev. Rep. 313 (1817). See STORY,
CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1846) §§ 619-628, wherein the views of Hertius,
Voet, Bartolus, Grotius, and Puffendorf are discussed.
46Supra note 45. A decree of the Spanish Republic confiscating the pri-
vate property of the former King of Spain, was held to be penal and therefore-
unenforceable in England where certain securities were situated. Banco de
Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria, [1935] 1 K. B. 140. See also
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224 (1892); Wisconsin v.
Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370 (1888) ; Blaine v. Curtis, 59
Vt. 120, 7 Atl. 708 (1887). See GOODRiCH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed.
1938) § 9.
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